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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 This brief is filed on behalf of professors of education, education law and 
educational measurement as amici curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Kim Cook et al. 1  Amici have dedicated their careers to studying education, 
educational testing, and/or education law.  Regardless of their backgrounds, 
all of amici have a commitment to valid, rigorous, and fair educational testing 
and evaluation of student and teacher performance.    
Amici have a significant interest in this case because the District Court’s 
erroneous rulings below immunize from constitutional attack uses of public 
teaching employee evaluation methods that are invalid, unreliable, and 
completely lacking in scholarly support, and are patently arbitrary teacher 
evaluation methods, which produce information that misleads, rather than 
informs.  If such methods were to bear a constitutional imprimatur—as they 
would under the District Court’s ruling, then public teaching employees 
nationwide would have their livelihoods, their careers, indeed their callings 
threatened by purely arbitrary decisions, clothed with a false veneer of 
rationality.  As teachers and scholars of education law and educational 
                                                          
1 A full list of the Amici appear in the Appendix to this brief.  The names of 
educational institutions are provided for identification purposes only.  
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measurement, amici strongly believe that such arbitrary decision making 
should not be viewed as constitutionally permissible in public educational 
institutions, and they collectively urge the court to consider the scholarly 
consensus in the academic community, that these methods—used as they are 
under the challenged policies in this case—are invalid, unreliable, and 
arbitrary means of making high-stakes decisions.   
Amici were unable to obtain consent from two of Defendants-Appellees 
for the filing of this brief, so amici have submitted with this brief a motion for 
leave of this Court to file as amici curiae.  See Fed. R. App. 29(a)-(b); 11th Cir. 
R. 29-1. 
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part.  No party or 
party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or 
submitting this brief.  No person—other than the amici curiae or their 
counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or 
submitting the brief.  See Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5). 
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ISSUE PRESENTED 
 Did the District Court err in holding that there was a rational basis for 
three public school districts to adopt policies, and for state officials to approve 
such policies, requiring teacher evaluations for the majority of teachers to be 
based on the test scores of students or in subjects the evaluated teachers did 
not and do not teach, where such policies subvert the purposes of test-based 
teacher evaluation and completely lack scholarly support?    
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INTRODUCTION AND  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 This case involves a challenge to the use of “value-added modeling” in 
three Florida school districts to judge the performance of teachers who had no 
meaningful opportunity to influence the test scores on which that 
performance judgment was based.  Amici are professors of education, 
education law, and educational measurement in several institutions of higher 
learning across the United States who are intimately familiar with value-
added modeling, its uses, and its problems.  Amici believe that the evaluation 
systems challenged in this case are patently irrational.  However, because 
these systems are also quite complex and are best understood in light of their 
historical context and current purposes, amici submit this brief in the hopes of 
assisting the Court in understanding just how preposterous the evaluation 
systems challenged here are.  Amici urge this Court to reject as 
unconstitutional an educational employee evaluation system adopted by the 
Defendants-Appellees that has absolutely no scholarly support or rational 
justification whatsoever, and that flatly contradicts the state’s avowed 
purpose in evaluating its teachers based on student growth.   
Based on recent statutory enactments, Florida’s school districts are now 
required to evaluate their teaching employees using a technique called “value-
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added modeling.”  Value-added modeling describes a statistical technique that 
researchers and evaluators use to attempt to isolate the effect that an 
independent variable (in Florida’s system as designed, the teaching 
performance of the teacher being evaluated in teaching the tested curriculum) 
has on a dependent variable (in Florida’s system as designed, the achievement 
of that teacher’s own students on the test of the curriculum taught), while 
controlling for other factors (called “covariates”) that might also be affecting 
the dependent variable.  There are many ways in which one might construct a 
value-added model in evaluating teaching performance, but they all share the 
same goal—isolating the effect of one teacher on the learning gains of that 
teacher’s own students in the subject the teacher teaches, and controlling for 
other causes of such learning gains, such as income, race, family 
circumstances, prior achievement levels, and school characteristics.   
 Even when used to evaluate teachers based on the performance of their 
own students on standardized tests of the curriculum that the evaluated 
teachers actually teach, value-added modeling is problematic and 
controversial, but it can be defended, and has garnered some acceptance in 
the scholarly literature, despite its known flaws.  However, this case deals 
with an entirely different use of value-added modeling altogether.  The school 
district Defendant-Appellees in this case, with the approval of the state official 
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Defendants-Appellees, used a value-added model based on the scores of one 
teacher’s students in one curricular subject to evaluate teachers who either do 
not teach those students at all, or do not teach them the subject on which they 
are tested.  This use conflicts with the central purpose of value-added 
modeling because it isolates the effects of one teacher—the teacher who 
taught the tested students the tested curriculum—and uses that effect to 
judge the performance of a completely different teacher.  This use of value-
added modeling also has no scholarly support whatsoever.  In fact, it is so 
irrational a concept to use the scores of one teacher’s students, or a test of one 
teacher’s subject, to judge the performance of another teacher of entirely 
different students and/or subjects that the scholarly literature does not even 
contain any studies examining such use.   
The district court below erred in holding that the state and district 
defendants “could rationally believe” that evaluating teachers using the test 
scores of students they have not taught, and/or in subjects they do not teach, 
would further an ostensible state interest in improving student achievement.  
In fact, the opposite is true.  It is clear to amici as experts on educational 
testing that this use of value-added modeling undermines rather than 
supports Florida’s important educational accountability objectives because it 
holds one teacher responsible for the work of another teacher, meaning that 
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there is nothing the evaluated teacher can do to improve her evaluation score 
by improving her own teaching.  Even to the layperson, it would appear 
arbitrary and irresponsible to evaluate one employee based on the work of 
another employee over which the evaluated employee has no supervisory 
control or authority.  Such arbitrary official decision making should not be 
part of our public employment apparatus, especially in our schools, where it is 
so important to determine accurately whether teachers are teaching well.  
Accordingly, amici respectfully urge reversal of the District Court’s ruling.  
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. EVEN WHEN USED CORRECTLY AS DESIGNED, VALUE-ADDED 
MODELING IS A CONTROVERSIAL METHOD FOR EVALUATING 
TEACHERS, PLAGUED BY CONCERNS OVER VALIDITY AND 
RELIABILITY. 
 
 Value-added modeling describes a group of highly complex statistical 
techniques that researchers and evaluators use to attempt to isolate the 
influence of an independent variable on the positive and negative changes in a 
dependent variable—in other words, to determine the “value” that the 
independent variable “adds” to the dependent variable.  When used for 
evaluating teachers, the independent variable is the performance of the 
teacher in the classroom, and the dependent variable is the achievement of 
the evaluated teacher’s students, typically as reflected in their scores on 
standardized tests.    
Value-added models such as the Florida model that is the subject of this 
case use the prior performance of students on several years of standardized 
tests, along with other factors, to compute an expected learning gain that each 
student should be able to accomplish from one testing year to the next.  
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(Florida Value-Added Technical Report, Dkt. 86-2,2 Exh. C, at 2-3) (hereinafter, 
“Fla. Tech. Rep.”).  Then, for each student, the model computes the current-
year test score that would be predicted based on one or more prior years of 
test scores together with additional student and school characteristics, and 
compares the current–year test score actually obtained to that prediction to 
determine whether the actual score was higher or lower than what the model 
predicted it would be.  If it is higher, then the teacher who taught the tested 
subject to that student will be viewed as having “added” positive “value” to the 
student’s achievement as compared to an average teacher, once other factors 
are controlled for.  If it is lower, then the teacher will be viewed as having 
“added” negative “value.”  Once all of these scores are computed, they are 
combined with each other and with another measure that reflects the 
characteristics of the school in which the teacher teaches, and this ultimately 
results in the teacher being assigned a value-added rating.  (Fla. Tech. Rep. at 
4-6.)  Under Florida law, this value-added rating generally must constitute at 
                                                          
2 Amici are mindful of 11th Circuit Rule 28-5 and its requirement that briefs 
contain citations to the Record on Appeal by volume, if available.  At the time 
of the filing of this brief and its accompanying Motion for Leave to File, the 
record excerpts have not yet been submitted to the Court.  Accordingly, amici 
cite the record as reflected in the District Court’s docket entries (“Dkt.”).  If the 
Court so wishes and directs, amici will convert the record citations herein to 
the desired format and file a substitute brief once the record is available.   
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least 50% of the teacher’s annual performance evaluation score that 
determines whether the teacher will be retained, dismissed, tenured, etc.  (Fla. 
Stat. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1); see also Expert Report of Edward H. Haertel, Dkt. 86-
13, ¶ 11) (hereinafter, “Haertel Rep.”).     
 The use of standardized test scores to evaluate teaching performance 
has always been controversial.  Critics have objected to it for many reasons, 
among them that standardized tests often measure only a narrow portion of 
what we hope students learn in school, and that they generally do so using the 
least expensive means—usually machine-scored multiple-choice questions, 
when other methods, such as essay or performance assessment, would be 
better aligned with the essential knowledge and skills we hope students will 
acquire in school.  (Haertel Rep. ¶ 53.) 
 These problems, however, pale in comparison to the unfairness that 
results when student scores on standardized tests are directly imputed to 
schools and teachers as measures of educational quality, without controlling 
for other factors that might cause differences in these scores.3  The 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., W. James Popham, Why Standardized Tests Don't Measure 
Educational Quality, 56 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 8, 8-15 (1999) (outlining this 
inherent flaw in using standardized tests as measures of educational quality 
without controlling for other factors).   
 
-11- 
 
measurement scholarship has established that only between one and 14 
percent of the variation in student test scores can be explained by the 
effectiveness of the teacher who taught the tested students in the tested 
subject.4  This means that anywhere from 86% to 99% of the variation in 
student test scores is the result of factors other than the quality of the teacher.  
Obviously, then, it would be the height of unfairness to judge teaching 
performance based on the test scores of a teacher’s students without 
controlling for all of those other causal factors.   
Value-added modeling was initially conceived as a way of addressing 
this problem by statistically controlling for measured factors other than 
teaching performance, such as student prior performance, language ability, 
socioeconomic status, race, and school characteristics, and thereby isolating 
the performance of a specific teacher as the cause of an identified learning 
gain.  (See Haertel Rep. ¶ 8).  Nevertheless, its use is controversial due to 
concerns over its validity and reliability.   
  “Validity” is a measurement term referring to the appropriateness of 
the inferences one seeks to draw, or the actions one seeks to take, based on 
                                                          
4 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE-ADDED 
MODELS FOR EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT (April 8, 2014), available at 
https://www.amstat.org/policy/pdfs/ASA_VAM_Statement.pdf .   
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the scores that a measurement yields.  For example, even the best and most 
carefully calibrated weight scale will provide a poor—or invalid—measure of 
height.  To measure height, one needs a tool that is a valid measure of height, 
such as a ruler.  Providing valid estimates of teachers’ effectiveness is very 
complex, for two reasons.  First, the goals of education are numerous and 
complex.  Second, there are many other factors that influence student 
performance, some of which have very strong influence.  The second of these 
is particularly important to the present case.  When many factors in addition 
to the construct the evaluator is interested in affect a variable, the factors 
other than the construct need to be “controlled.”   
The isolation of teaching performance is theorized to be a good way to 
ensure the validity of the use of student test scores to judge teaching 
performance because it is accomplished through controlling for measurable 
factors other than teaching that contribute to student achievement.  In 
practice, the Florida value-added model pursues such isolation of teaching 
performance as a causal factor by first controlling for many other plausible 
factors that may influence the FCAT scores of the tested students—namely, 
each student’s prior test scores; the number of courses in the tested subject 
that each student takes; each student’s disabilities (if any); each student’s 
ability to speak and read English; whether each student is gifted; each 
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student’s attendance record; the mobility of each student from school to 
school during the school year; the tendency of students to be promoted to the 
next grade after one year; the size of the class each student is in for the tested 
subject; and the existing differences, or variance, in test scores among the 
students in the tested class.  (Fla. Tech. Rep., pp. 3-4).    
Once the model controls for these factors, a large portion of the variance 
in FCAT scores, and therefore a large portion of the gains or losses in 
achievement among the teacher’s students, will have been accounted for by 
the controlled non-teaching factors.  The residual portion of the student 
learning gains not accounted for by these factors is then assumed to be caused 
by the teaching performance of the teacher who taught the tested students in 
the tested subject.  (Fla. Tech. Rep., pp. 6-7).  In other words, even when used 
as designed, the Florida value-added model does not arrive at a direct 
conclusion that a particular teacher’s performance caused a portion of student 
learning gains.  Rather, it assumes this conclusion based on the existence of a 
residual student gain not accounted for by the controlled non-teaching factors.  
Id.   
Such an assumption depends heavily on the further assumption that all 
relevant non-teaching factors have been adequately accounted for in the 
model, but some outside factors are impossible to control in any statistical 
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model of this type.  (Haertel Rep. ¶ 23).  For example, scholars have identified 
“peer effects”—the increases and decreases in learning growth that a student 
experiences by being placed in classes with strong or weak students—as a 
factor that value-added modeling has trouble controlling for.5  Additionally, in 
Florida, because the value-added model compares the scores of students at 
the end of one academic year to the scores of those same students at the end 
of another academic year, it cannot control for learning losses that occur over 
the summer.  The scholarship establishes that students in lower 
socioeconomic categories suffer more learning loss than those in higher 
socioeconomic categories.  (Haertel Rep. ¶ 25).  In the absence of an adequate 
control for summer learning loss, then, a teacher of reading or math will be 
held responsible for such loss, even though she lacks any ability to prevent it 
because she will not even meet the tested students in question until after the 
learning loss happens.  In short, there is a significant concern that, even when 
used as designed, value-added models may be measuring the influence of 
                                                          
5 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GETTING VALUE OUT OF VALUE-ADDED: REPORT OF A 
WORKSHOP, H. Braun, , N. Chudowsky, & J. Koenig, (Eds.) (Washington, D.C.: The 
National Academies Press 2010)., available at 
http://216.78.200.159/Documents/RandD/Other/Getting%20Value%20out
%20of%20Value-
Added.pdfhttp://216.78.200.159/Documents/RandD/Other/Getting%20Valu
e%20out%20of%20Value-Added.pdf  
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factors confounded with the factor they attempt to isolate—teacher 
effectiveness.  In measurement terms, value-added models such as the one 
used by Florida therefore may not be “valid” measures of teaching quality.   
Aside from concerns over validity, which can be minimized (though 
never eliminated) through careful model design and implementation, another 
pressing problem that the scholarship has identified with value-added models 
is their very low “reliability.”  (Haertel Rep. ¶ 44.)  Reliability is a 
measurement term used to describe the consistency of a test in measuring the 
same construct from one administration to the next.  For example, though a 
weight scale is obviously a valid measure of weight, for the scale to be a 
reliable measure of weight, it must read “10 pounds” when a 10-pound 
bowling ball is placed on it, and it must do so every time the bowling ball is 
placed on it.  If it reads “10 pounds” the first time, and then “4 pounds” the 
second time for the same object, then the scale is not a reliable measure of 
weight.   
In measurement scholarship, reliability is measured using a coefficient, 
the value of which can range from zero to one.  A value of one indicates perfect 
reliability—a scale that reads “10 pounds” every time the 10-pound bowling 
ball is placed on it.  A score of zero indicates no reliability—a scale that might 
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read literally any value each time the same 10-pound bowling ball is placed on 
it.   
Scholarship has established that the reliability of value-added model 
scores from year to year ranges between .2 to .4—or very low reliability.6  By 
way of comparison, well-known standardized tests such as the SAT and the 
ACT typically have reliability coefficients on the order of .8 to .9.7  To better 
understand how weak these coefficients are, the authors of one study divided 
the teachers evaluated into quintiles and tracked the stability of their ratings 
placement from quintile to quintile over two years.  They found that teachers 
who scored in the top quintile one year were just as likely to find themselves 
in one of the bottom two quintiles the next year as they were to find 
themselves in the top quintile again.8  Such large changes in ratings from year 
                                                          
6 See D. F. McCaffrey, T. R. Sass, J. R. Lockwood, & K. Mihaly, The Intertemporal 
Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates, 4 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y, 572, 572–606 
(2009). 
7 See, e.g., ACT, INC., THE ACT TECHNICAL MANUAL (2007), at 59, t. 4.13, available 
at  http://www.act.org/aap/pdf/ACT_Technical_Manual.pdf (last visited Sept. 
10, 2014); see also THE COLLEGE BOARD, TEST CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAT: 
RELIABILITY, DIFFICULTY LEVELS, COMPLETION RATES (2013), available at 
http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/Test-
Characteristics-of-SAT-2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).   
8 McCaffrey et al., supra note 6, at 572-606.  
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to year indicate that the value-added model studied (a precursor to Florida’s 
current model) was very imprecise.   
Despite these flaws, it is accepted by a portion of the scholarly 
community that, when meticulously constructed and used as designed, a 
value-added model can provide enough useful information over time to justify 
using model-derived ratings as one element of the overall evaluation of a 
teacher.  Important to this acceptance, however, is the assumption that such a 
model will be designed to isolate the influence of the teaching performance of 
the teacher who teaches the tested students in the tested subject.  Amici do 
not take a position here on that use of the Florida value-added model—the use 
for which it was designed.  As amici explain further below, however, the uses 
to which Florida’s value-added model has been put in this case are 
fundamentally different from these intended uses, in that they violate the 
central assumptions underlying value-added evaluation, they completely lack 
scholarly support or rational justification, and they directly undermine 
Florida’s ostensible goal in using value-added modeling in teacher evaluation.   
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
EVALUATION METHODS USED BY THE DEFENDANTS WERE 
RATIONALLY RELATED TO ANY LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST IN 
IMPROVING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT.  
 The district court entered judgment for both the State Defendants-
Appellees (hereinafter, the “State”) and the District Defendants-Appellees 
(hereinafter, the “Districts”), based on two separate Orders, the first 
dismissing claims challenging the Florida statute that requires the use of 
student growth scores as a major portion of each teacher’s evaluation (Dkt. 
111), and the second awarding summary judgment to the Defendants-
Appellees on the claims challenging the District policies implementing the 
statute by evaluating the Plaintiffs-Appellants based on the work of other 
teachers (Dkt. 112).  Both of these Orders held that the decision makers for 
each Defendant-Appellee “could rationally believe” that the use of value-
added ratings computed from the test scores of one teacher’s students to 
assign a performance rating to another teacher who did not teach those 
students, and/or did not teach the tested subject, furthered a state interest in 
“improving student achievement.”  These decisions were erroneous for 
several reasons.  The remainder of this Brief explains three of those reasons:  
(1) the challenged uses directly contradict the purpose of using value-added 
modeling; (2) the challenged uses lack any support in the scholarship or any 
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rational justification; and (3) the challenged uses undermine Florida’s 
ostensible goals in using employee evaluation ratings based on student test 
scores to improve student achievement.    
A. The use of value-added modeling scores derived from testing of 
students and/or subjects the Appellant teachers do not teach 
directly contradicts the methodological justification for using 
value-added modeling. 
 
 As introduced above, value-added modeling attempts to address the 
many objections to the use of standardized test scores to judge educational 
quality by isolating the effect of one teacher on the standardized test scores of 
that teacher’s students, in the subject that teacher teaches, while controlling for 
the influence of other factors on such scores.  Florida’s model takes its student 
test scores from the annually administered Florida Comprehensive 
Achievement Test (“FCAT”), which tests reading in grades 3-10, and math in 
grades 3-8.  The assumption of the value-added model used in Florida is that, 
once all of the non-teaching factors are controlled for, all of the remaining 
nonrandom variation in student achievement on the FCAT is attributable to 
the efficacy of the student’s teacher with respect to the tested curriculum.  
Florida adds to this attribution a portion of the students’ score variation that 
can be attributed to school factors other than teaching, in a laudable effort to 
account for overall differences between schools.  (Fla. Tech. Rep., pp. 4-6.)  So, 
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the Florida model’s design requires (1) accounting for all measurable and 
measured factors that might explain student performance other than the 
performance of the student’s teacher in the tested curriculum; (2) assuming 
that any variation not explained by those non-teaching factors was caused by 
the student’s teacher in the tested curriculum; and then (3) computing a 
rating for that teacher based on that residual portion of student score gains, 
adjusted for overall student achievement in the teacher’s school.   
 The District Court divided the Appellant teachers into two groups, based 
on the circumstances that caused them to object to the use of these computed 
scores to judge their teaching.  What the District Court termed “Type B” 
teachers are those who taught students who took the FCAT, but who did not 
teach any FCAT-tested curriculum to those students—for example, a sixth-
grade science teacher.   What the District Court termed “Type C” teachers are 
those who taught in grades in which no students take the FCAT (kindergarten 
through second grade, as well as eleventh and twelfth grade), or in third 
grade, the year students take only the baseline (first administration) test, 
thereby making the computation of any “student growth score” impossible.  
(Order Granting Summ. Judg. to Def., Dkt. 112, pp. 4-5). 
 The Districts computed value-added ratings for the Type B teachers 
based on the reading and/or math FCAT scores of the students whom the 
 
-21- 
 
Type B teachers taught non-tested curricula, such as music or science.  
(Haertel Rep. ¶ 16.)  For the Type C teachers, even this was not possible, so 
the Districts assigned each of these teachers a value-added rating made up 
entirely of the portion of the variance in test scores attributable to non-
teaching factors at the teachers’ schools.  (Haertel Rep. ¶ 15).9  Indeed, 
Defendant-Appellee Alachua County Schools even evaluated the teachers of 
one elementary school that contained only grades kindergarten through 
second (Irby) using the test scores of the fifth-grade students of a completely 
different elementary school (Alachua) (Pl. Motion for Summ. J., Dkt. 86, p. 2).   
 It should be readily apparent that these uses are completely antithetical 
to the methodological purpose of value-added modeling—to isolate the effect 
of one teacher on the performance of that teacher’s students in the subject that 
teacher teaches.  As to the Type B teachers, assigning a value-added rating to a 
teacher who did not teach the curriculum tested, while also attributing that 
same residual variation in student scores after controlling for non-teaching 
                                                          
9 As Dr. Haertel, the Appellants’ expert, explains, in two of the Districts, the 
score was actually a combination of the school portion and the average of the 
teacher portion for all of the teachers in the school, but since the teachers’ 
value-added scores would have naturally roughly balanced each other out, the 
scores in these Districts were actually nearly entirely a reflection of the school 
portion.  (Haertel ¶ 15, n.2). 
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factors to the teacher who actually did teach the tested curriculum, makes the 
value-added rating of the Type B teacher entirely dependent on the 
performance of the teacher of the tested curriculum.  In effect, the model 
isolates the teaching performance of one teacher and attributes the 
responsibility for it to another teacher—a use that could not be more at odds 
with the model’s design.     
 As to the Type C teachers, the use of the portion of student score 
variance explained by non-teaching school factors takes a covariate designed 
to control for school characteristics, and to thereby make the individual 
teacher ratings more accurate and valid by adjusting for between-school 
differences, and uses it as the sole determinant of whether a Type C teacher is 
performing well.  In other words, even though the central purpose of using a 
value-added model to evaluate teaching employees is to isolate the influence 
of one teacher’s performance on her student’s achievement, the ratings of the 
Type C teachers isolate precisely nothing at the teacher level.  Type C teachers 
are rated based on the overall performance of students in the school who take 
the FCAT.  No attempt is made to isolate any influence that the Type C teacher 
(or indeed any other teacher) had on that performance.  Rather than 
separating effective from ineffective teachers, the model as applied to Type C 
teachers rates every single teacher in the same school who does not teach 
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FCAT-tested students or subjects as equally effective or ineffective.  The ratings 
of the Type C teachers therefore are completely at odds with the state’s goals 
in adopting value-added modeling of improving student achievement by 
enhancing the quality of teaching based on meaningful and relevant 
information about teaching performance.       
B. The use of value-added modeling scores derived from testing of 
students and/or subjects the Appellant teachers do not teach 
has absolutely no scholarly support.  
 
Measurement scholarship has established that between one and 
fourteen percent of a student’s standardized test score gains can be attributed 
to the effectiveness of the student’s teacher in the tested subject based on 
value-added modeling.10  However, no scholarship whatsoever has established 
that any portion of a student’s test score performance can be explained by the 
teaching performance of teachers who do not teach that student, or who do 
not teach the tested curriculum.   
This lack of scholarly support is not surprising.  The uses to which the 
Districts have put Florida’s value-added model are directly in conflict with the 
purpose of value-added modeling, which is to isolate the classroom 
                                                          
10 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE-ADDED 
MODELS FOR EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT (April 8, 2014), available at 
https://www.amstat.org/policy/pdfs/ASA_VAM_Statement.pdf .   
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effectiveness of one teacher as the cause of an identified student learning gain.  
In fact, the idea that anything other than a trivially miniscule portion of a 
student’s performance in the tested curriculum could be explained by the 
performance of teachers who do not teach that curriculum or that student is 
so ludicrous that the scholarly community has not even examined it.  (Haertel 
Rep. ¶ 57.)   
One need not be an expert to understand why there is a complete lack of 
any scholarship even hinting at examining the hypothesis.  Scholars do not 
study these methods for the same reason they do not evaluate whether to 
award a diploma to one student based on another student’s standardized test 
scores—it is facially preposterous and patently irrational to even consider 
doing so.  Likewise, it is preposterous to believe that one teacher can or 
should be held accountable for the growth or lack thereof in test scores of 
students they do not teach, or on tests given to assess a curriculum they do 
not teach and for which they do not claim any expertise.  No rational school 
district would voluntarily adopt such a system, no rational parents would 
choose to have their children’s teachers evaluated in this manner, and no 
rational teacher would choose to be evaluated in this way.   
The State and the Districts simply pulled these methods out of thin air, 
with no justification for them from any source.  When pressed during 
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deposition testimony, even the State’s own witness could not come up with a 
rationale for these methods, and witnesses for the three school district 
defendants each affirmatively agreed that the use of these methods weakens 
their teacher evaluation systems.  (Pl. Motion for Summ. J., Dkt. 86, p. 5.).  The 
District Court’s hypothesizing that the State and the Districts “could rationally 
believe” that using scores in this way would further student achievement is 
therefore belied by the facts and should be rejected by this Court on that basis 
alone.     
C.  The use of value-added modeling scores derived from testing of 
students and/or subjects the Appellant teachers do not teach 
works against the State’s ostensible goal of “improving student 
achievement” because it holds teachers accountable for student 
achievement results that the teachers cannot influence.   
   
 The State’s ostensible goal in adopting value-added modeling as the 
basis for teacher evaluation statewide is “improving student achievement.”  
However, the State’s goal of “improving student achievement” is meaningless 
in the context of value-added assessment unless the assumption underlying it 
is that, when teachers receive lower value-added scores, they will respond to 
those scores by taking action to improve their practices, thereby improving 
student achievement and increasing their own value-added ratings.  But 
basing the value-added score for the Appellants on the performance of 
students they either do not teach at all or to whom they do not teach the 
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tested curriculum bases the score entirely on matters that are outside the 
control or influence of the teacher.  There is no rational basis for any state or 
district official to have believed that incentivizing teachers to somehow 
improve scores over which their own teaching practices have no influence 
would improve student achievement.    
Under the State’s value-added model, all of the residual score variation 
left over after the non-teaching factors are accounted for is attributed to the 
student’s teacher in the tested subject, meaning that none of this residual 
variation is attributable to any other cause, including the performance of 
another teacher.  Similarly, the school’s overall score is not connected to any 
particular teacher, but is the State’s way of calibrating overall student 
achievement levels in the school in the tested subjects and controlling for it to 
account for the differences between schools.  If the State’s goal is indeed 
improving student achievement, then there is literally nothing the Appellants 
can do purposely to improve their own teaching in response to their value-
added ratings to serve that goal because neither the Type B ratings nor the 
Type C ratings contain any useful information about the Appellants’ own 
teaching performance.    
To illustrate, under the uses of the value-added model adopted by the 
Districts and approved by the State, if an ineffective Type B teacher is lucky 
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enough to share students with an exemplary reading teacher, for example, that 
Type B teacher will be judged to be an excellent performer based on that 
exemplary reading teacher’s own good performance, despite the Type B 
teacher’s ineffective teaching in his or her own subject.  Conversely, if a highly 
effective Type B teacher is unlucky enough to share students with a 
particularly poor reading teacher, the Type B teacher will be judged to be a 
substandard teacher, despite the fact of the Type B teacher’s own excellent 
teaching performance.  The only thing that the first Type B teacher can do in 
response to such an unfair, misleading, and arbitrary rating of her 
performance is to work the back channels of her school administration to 
make sure that she does not share any students with the poor reading teacher 
the next year.  This outcome manifestly does not serve the purpose of 
improving student achievement.  In fact, since it incentivizes not better 
teaching but administrative gamesmanship, it works against that purpose.   
Similarly to the Type B teachers, the Type C teachers, who are rated 
based on the overall performance of their schools, cannot control or change 
the characteristics of the schools into which they are assigned, and they 
cannot do anything to influence, for example, the quality of the principal’s 
leadership, the school’s faculty-student ratio, or the average years of 
experience of the teachers with whom they teach—all non-teaching factors 
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that are plausibly part of the overall school score.   So, if for example a Type C 
teacher who is an exemplary classroom teacher is recruited to a struggling 
school to teach disadvantaged students, and she does a terrific job with her 
own students but does not teach any FCAT-tested grade levels, she will 
nevertheless be rated as a poor teacher if the FCAT scores of the students she 
does not teach fall short of their predicted growth.  The only thing that such a 
teacher can do in response to such an unfair, misleading, and arbitrary way of 
rating her teaching performance is to secure an assignment to a more 
advantaged school.  Once again, since it incentivizes administrative 
gamesmanship rather than better teaching, this outcome is manifestly at odds 
with the ostensible state goal of improving achievement for all students 
irrespective of their circumstances. 
 The District Court’s opinions elided these obvious problems and judged 
to be “rational” a completely fanciful and ludicrous theory of causation that is 
squarely at odds with both the purpose of value-added modeling and the 
evidence in the record.  Under the District Court’s reasoning, if the teacher 
evaluation systems in the Districts were instead based on increases and 
decreases in sales of healthy food in the school lunchroom (either to the 
teacher’s own students or to the student body as a whole), then it would be 
“rational” to hire, fire, tenure, deny tenure to, or otherwise discipline the 
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teachers based on those sales because it is conceivable that one could believe 
that all teachers in a school should be promoting healthy lifestyles, and that 
the healthier a student’s eating choices are, the more likely that student will 
be ready, willing, and able to learn—thereby improving student achievement.  
Obviously, using such a method for rating teachers would be ridiculous, but 
the Type B and Type C teachers have no more control over the teaching of 
their colleagues in other grades and/or subjects than they do over the sales 
abilities of the cafeteria staff.   
 The law of this Circuit also dictates reversal in this case.  See Debra P. v. 
Turlington, 644 F. 2d 397, 404-406 (5th Cir. 1981).11  The Court in Turlington 
established the proposition that, when states and school districts make high-
stakes decisions based on standardized tests, those tests must be fair, and the 
uses to which they are put must be valid.  See id. (remanding for a showing 
that what was tested on a high school exit examination was actually taught in 
Florida’s high schools).  That principle requires reversal here.  Using a method 
to evaluate the Appellants that bears no relation to the work that they actually 
do, and that depends entirely on teaching behaviors of other teachers whom 
                                                          
11 Decisions of the Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981 are binding precedent 
in the Eleventh Circuit.  Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th 
Cir. 1981). 
 
-30- 
 
the Appellants have no opportunity to control, is just as arbitrary and 
irrational as denying diplomas to students based on their test performance 
where the test covers material they never had the opportunity to learn.  See id.   
Simply put, holding people accountable for results they cannot meaningfully 
influence or control is patently arbitrary and irrational, and when used in a 
public school district to make high-stakes decisions, it violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully join the Plaintiffs-
Appellants in requesting that this Court reverse the judgments below 
dismissing the claims challenging the Florida statute that gave rise to these 
evaluation policies, and granting summary judgment in favor of the School 
District Defendants on the claims challenging their policies implementing the 
statute in ways not only contrary to the statute’s overall purposes but also 
devoid of scholarly warrant or rational justification.   
If rational basis review is to mean anything at all, it must not permit 
public school evaluation policies which undermine the very goals they are 
adopted to pursue, particularly where there is not the slightest hint of 
scholarly support or rational justification for such policies.  Accordingly, amici 
respectfully urge reversal of the District Court’s ruling, along with some 








